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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of sovereign debt cris es 
by using cross-country data from 1977 to 2010. In particular, I 
focus on the structure of sovereign debt by analysing the debt 
composition (domestic versus external), maturity structure (short -
term versus long-term), composition type (bank loans versus bond) 
and currency denomination (domestic currency versus foreign 
currency) of debts.  I also assess whether the previous history of 
banking and currency crises affect the likelihood of a sovereign 
debt crisis. The results suggest that both the structures of debt and 
the past history of other financial crises are important 
determinants of debt crises. The results are robust when using 
alternative measures to understand the risks of sovereign debt. I 
also investigate the impacts of debt structure and past financial 
crises history on the levels and changes of foreign and local 
currency long-term debt credit ratings.  
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 which began in the United States, 
had a huge global impact. The burst of the U.S. housing bubble posed an 
unprecedented impact to the U.S. financial sector and then spread to 
financial markets overseas. The contagion effect and a combination of 
factors, such as high debt levels, inflexibility of monetary policy, and the 
loss of investors’ confidence led to the European debt crisis.1 However, 
the global financial shock had an asymmetric effect across the Eurozone. 
The cross-border financial flow dried up in late 2008, and investors 
repatriated funds to their home markets.
2
 Countries with an over-reliance 
on external funding were badly affected. For example, the banking 
system in Ireland collapsed because of its reliance on international short-
term funding. Similarly, market indicators in many other developed 
countries dropped significantly during the crisis.
3
   
The global financial crisis also exposed the risk of sovereign default in 
many developed economies. It is widely known that many countries’ 
governments have been issuing sovereign debt to finance their budgets. 
Even governments in developed countries have issued huge debts to 
                                                          
1 Lane (2012) points out that while France and Germany had stable debt/GDP ratios at around 60 
percent in the decade prior to the onset of the financial crisis, both Italy and Greece had debt/GDP 
ratios above 90 percent during that period.  
2 See Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) for the analysis of the patterns of the retrenchment in international 
capital flows during the global financial crisis. 
3 See Constancio (2012). 
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stimulate their economies since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
For example, the United Kingdom, which historically had low levels of 
public debt, experienced a surge in the debt-to-GDP ratio to 85 percent in 
2010 from 42 percent in 2007.
4
 Iceland, one of the original members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
also experienced both banking and currency crises in 2008 following the 
U.S. financial crisis. Its debt-to-GDP ratio was only 23 percent in 2007 
but sharply increased to 87 percent in 2009. However, investors generally 
believed that there was no risk in holding government bonds of 
developed countries. Thus, it is imperative to understand the risks 
involved with issuing sovereign debt. 
 Sovereign debt crises have been one of the most popular research areas in 
international finance, especially since the widespread incidence of debt 
crises in Latin America in the 1980s (see Figure 1). Yet we systematically 
fail to understand or predict the risk of sovereign debt crises. In a speech, 
Rudiger Dornbusch (1997) noted, “The crisis takes a much longer time 
coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would 
have thought, and that’s sort of exactly the Mexican story. It took forever 
and then it took a night.” In this research, I aim to explore the 
determinants of sovereign debt crises by focusing on factors that have 
been somewhat over-looked in the literature. In particular, I focus on the 
                                                          
4 The data is retrieved from the OECD library. 
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role of debt structure in understanding the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. 
In Section 2, I describe in detail why different debt structures matter and 
how they posit different risks for debt crises. I also focus on both external 
and domestic debt crises and analyse them with a broader set of 
countries, including some developed countries. This, to my knowledge, 
has not been carefully considered in the literature. 
 Most researchers have focused on external debt crises in emerging 
markets. Until recently, studies focusing on developed countries as well as 
domestic debt problems were scarce. The debt-to-GDP ratio in developed 
countries has steadily increased since the mid-1970s and began to rise 
rapidly with the start of the global financial crisis. (see Figure 2.)
5
 
Additionally, Figure 2 shows that the same ratio for non-OECD countries 
reached a peak around 1990 and trended downward since then, with a few 
spikes in-between. This trend suggests that many emerging market 
countries have become more financially prudent in the last two decades 
than the developed countries.
6
 
Figure 2 also shows that the OECD countries have higher ratios of the 
central government debt-to-GDP since the mid-2000s. For instance, the 
Japanese government has accumulated more than 200 percent of the 
                                                          
5 Nelson (2013) indicates that the government debt per GDP ratios in the G7 countries have increased 
rapidly since 2008. 
6 For an explanation of the trends in the debt-to-GDP ratios of emerging markets and developed 
countries, see Das et al. (2010). 
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country’s GDP as debt, and it incurs debt servicing cost every year even 
under the current historically low interest rate conditions.
7
  Accordingly, 
once interest rates start to increase, the government’s debt burden will 
also increase. Hence, Japanese debt is not sustainable in the long run.
8
 
However, the Japanese government bond yield and CDS have been at a 
very low level compared to other government bonds.
9
 This indicates that 
the market perceives Japanese government debt to be less risky compared 
to the government debt issued by many other countries. On the other 
hand, some Caribbean countries with a much lower debt-to-GDP ratio 
than Japan and a higher trade-to-GDP ratio over a period of time have 
experienced debt restructurings since the global financial crisis.
10
 
Examples include debt restructurings in Ecuador in 2008, Jamaica in 
2010, and Belize and Grenada in 2012.
11
 What is the explanation?  Is the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio a good predictor of a debt crisis?   
One critical difference between Japanese government debt and sovereign 
debt of other countries, such as the Caribbean countries or Greece, is the 
debt structure. Most Japanese government debt is owned domestically 
                                                          
7 General government debt per GDP in Japan was 228 percent in 2011(source: the OECD library). 
8 For the sustainability of the Japanese government’s debt, see Doi, Hoshi and Okimoto (2011) and Ito 
(2011). 
9 Japanese 10- year government bond yield is 0.59, whereas the same bond yield for the U.K. and the 
U.S. are 2.81 and 2.74, respectively, on February 17, 2014 (source: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/). 
10 Trade- to-GDP of Caribbean and Non-Caribbean countries is illustrated in Figure 3. 
11 See Durant (2012) for the debt situation in the Caribbean countries. 
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and is denominated in local currency, i.e. Japanese yen. Since developed 
countries usually issue their debts in their local currency, the currency 
risk of holding these debts is much lower (e.g. huge currency 
depreciation in the short period), compared to developing countries’ 
debts, which are primarily denominated in foreign currencies. It is thus 
very important to understand these differences in the debt structure to 
understand the risk of debt crises in different countries.  
Understanding debt crises is also important, as it is often related to 
banking or currency crises – the infamous “twin currency” phenomenon. 
In many countries, syndicated banks are the main creditors of the 
governments, and therefore, the linkage of these two crises is very 
important. Laeven and Valencia (2012) state that banking crises usually 
result in larger output losses and higher increases in government debt in 
advanced economies due to deeper banking systems. Another potential 
cause of the twin crises - debt and currency crisis – is that the developing 
countries usually issue their debts in foreign currency. For example, 
Uruguay experienced large depreciation of its currency in 2002, and as a 
result, the government decided to restructure its international bonds in 
2003.
12
 Thus the relationship between bank loans and the bond markets is 
an important issue for understanding debt crises. 
                                                          
12 For Uruguay’s experience, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). 
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This research reveals the impact of the debt structure on the risk of 
sovereign debt crisis in both developed and developing countries. 
Specifically, this study addresses the differences in external versus 
domestic debt; currency composition of debt; type of borrowing between 
bank loans and bond financing; and the maturity structure of debt to 
understand the risks of sovereign debt crises. I also investigate the 
relationship among financial, banking, and debt crises to appreciate the 
causes of the latter. I believe that understanding these phenomena helps 
both academics and policy makers make prudent macroeconomic policies 
and reduce the likelihood of a debt crisis. 
 
2 Sovereign Debt Crisis: Theoretical Issues 
This section addresses in detail the theoretical issues regarding sovereign 
debt crises. The aim of this section has been to conceptually discuss the 
theoretical issues with sovereign debt without explicitly modelling it. To 
investigate the determinants of sovereign debt crises, it is essential to 
answer some fundamental questions: What is sovereign debt and in what 
way is it different from corporate debt? Why do investors buy 
government debt? What are the risks of buying it? Why do sovereign 
debt crises occur? Understanding these answers will help in resolving the 
fundamental issues of sovereign debt crises.   
9 
 
2.1      Why do sovereigns repay their debt?  
Sovereign debt is an accumulation of government’s annual deficits 
financed by bonds. It is important for governments to borrow money if 
they do not have enough money for their expenditures, because countries 
want to smooth their consumptions (Kletzer & Wright, 2000). Mankiw 
(1987) and Trehan and Walsh (1990) also argue that governments want to 
smooth their revenue as marginal social costs increase by raising the tax 
rate. Why do countries choose to issue debt in the financial markets and 
not simply print more money? Economic theories and history indicate 
that abusing the power of printing money results in hyperinflation. For 
example, the German government printed unlimited currency to pay its 
resolution payments of World War I. As a result, Germany experienced a 
monthly inflation rate of 29,500 percent in October 1923 (Hanke & Krus, 
2012).
13
 Thus, governments usually finance their debts through issuing 
bonds in the domestic and international markets or borrowing from 
syndicated banks.  
 Sovereign debt is different from corporate debt, because creditors of 
sovereign debt cannot force repayment in the same manner as the creditors 
                                                          
13 Hanke and Krus (2012) provide examples of 56 episodes of hyperinflations including the start and end 
date of each episode, and the peak month of hyperinflation as well as the highest monthly inflation 
rate. Hungary experienced the world’s worst hyperinflation with its highest monthly inflation rate of 
4.19 x 1016 percent in July 1946. More recently, Zimbabwe recorded its highest monthly inflation rate 
of 7.96 x 1010 percent in mid-November 2008. 
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of corporate debt.
14
 A seniority structure does not exist in sovereign debt.
15
 
There is no international law to enforce repayment, and therefore, its 
creditors cannot avoid risks of compulsory rescheduling, interest rate 
reduction and even repudiation. Then, why do sovereigns repay their debt? 
It is generally believed that a loss of credibility, which makes it more 
difficult for a country to borrow in the future, is a reason for the repayment. 
In their seminal paper, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) analyse borrowing of 
countries in the international capital market. They explain that the risk of 
permanent exclusion from the market when borrowers repudiate provides 
incentives for countries to repay their debt. This reputation-motivated 
argument was challenged by Bulow and Rogoff (1989). They argued that 
reputation cannot sustain repayment in equilibrium and explained that it 
was the ability to punish the debtor country that was important. Their 
explanation was based on creditors’ ability to impose a threat like direct 
sanctions, which provided incentives for countries to repay debt.
16
 In 
another paper, Kletzer and Wright (2000) show that the reputation 
argument could be sustained in a model of inter-temporal barter, because 
most relationships of sovereign debt continue through renegotiation. Their 
arguments are based on consumption-smoothing and punish the cheater. 
                                                          
14 See Nelson (2013) for the differences between sovereign and private debts. 
15 The difficulty in providing a seniority structure in sovereign debt has been discussed by Bolton and 
Jeanne (2009). 
16 Rose (2005) had empirically tested this argument and found debt renegotiation led to significant 
decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is 
approximately eight percent a year and persists for around fifteen years. 
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However, many countries have defaulted multiple times and the average 
period of exclusion of the defaulted country from the international capital 
markets is only 5.7 years.
17
 Thus, the threat of the loss of credibility in the 
international financial market or direct sanctions cannot be sufficient 
reasons for countries to repay their debt. There may be other aspects of 
sovereign debt which we need to understand better.  
  
 2.2     Why is the debt structure important? 
Figures 4 through 9 provide some examples of the differences in the debt 
structure around the crisis period for several countries. The term, debt 
structure is generally used to describe different characteristics of debts 
such as maturity (short-term or long-term), type (bank loans or bonds), 
and currency composition (local-currency or foreign-currency). In the 
90s, the emerging markets experienced a rapid growth of bond issuance 
as the primary source of finance, which during the 70s was dominated by 
the banks. At the same time, the role of banks in mediating capital flow 
to emerging markets did not completely vanish. On the contrary, the 
Asian countries had been relying heavily on the syndicate bank loans as 
the major source of borrowing in the period leading up to the 1997-1998 
financial crises. So bank loans and bonds clearly compete in the 
                                                          
17 According to Richmond and Dias (2007), partial access to the international capital market is regained 
after 5.7 years on average, but it takes 8.4 years on average to regain full access.  
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international market. This issue is important for numerous reasons. The 
composition of sovereign debt and how it affects debt restructuring 
negotiations in the event of financial distress has become a central policy 
issue in recent years. Over the past decade, the share of sovereign bonds 
and the greater dispersion of ownership of these bonds have made 
sovereign debt difficult to renegotiate and restructure. Zettelmeyer (2005) 
provides evidence on the recent restructuring episodes of different 
countries. He finds that there has been differential treatment of claims 
that were not legally prioritised in most debt restructurings that have 
taken place over the last 25 years. Restructurings under the Brady Plan in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, Russia and Ukraine during 1998-2000, Pakistan 
in 1999, Ecuador in 2000, Uruguay in 2003 and the never-ending 
Argentine restructuring are some examples. 
Differential treatment has two forms: first, defaulted instruments were 
often restructured on quite different terms. Second, governments have 
defaulted selectively on some classes of claims but not on others. For 
example, the “Brady Deals” that settled the debt crises of the 1980s 
restructured bank loans but not international bonds. Russia and Ukraine’s 
restructurings involved domestic debt, bilateral official debt and bank 
loans, but not Eurobonds. Pakistan restructured bilateral official debt, 
bank claims and, for the first time, Eurobonds, but not domestic debt. 
Ecuador restructured domestic debt, bilateral official debt and 
13 
 
international bonds (both Eurobonds and Brady bonds), but not bank 
loans. Uruguay restructured both domestic and external bonds, but 
neither bank loans nor official bilateral loans.  
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) note that emerging market 
countries tend to have a larger portion of foreign currency denominated 
and short-maturity debts than developed countries. This makes their 
economies vulnerable to changes in the exchange rate. Thus it is 
important to understand the different structures of debt. 
 
2.2.1     Domestic versus External Debt 
External debt is usually thought to be riskier compared to domestic debt 
since the government has the power to tax its residents. This means that 
domestic debt is a transfer of resources within the country. The Japanese 
government debt was 204 percent of its GDP in 2011, which is much 
higher than that of Greece or Italy. However, Japan still has not defaulted 
and its Credit Default Swap (CDS) rate and government bond yields are 
still very low.
18
  One possible reason for this is that more than 90 percent 
of Japanese debt is owned domestically. So, this composition seems to be 
important. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) indicate that defaults and 
                                                          
18 41.975 basis points for 5 years CDS and 0.72% for 10 years government bond in 07/01/2014 (source: 
CNBC http://www.cnbc.com/id/38451750).  
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restructurings of domestic debt are more common than those of external 
debt. Moreover, domestic debt has been of a greater proportion to total 
debt since the late 1940s (see Figure 10). However, the literature has 
focused more on external debt crises episodes (Das et al., 2010).  
 
2.2.2     Short term versus Long term debt 
Maturity is the date on which a debt becomes due for payment. Maturity 
matters because in theory, short term liabilities are more vulnerable to 
changes in market conditions. It is also subject to liquidity problems due 
to the necessity of more frequent repayment, and has a rollover risk 
because it needs to be rolled over in the short term. We know that rational 
investors tend not to invest in long term debts in emerging market 
countries. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) examine the sovereign debt 
structure focusing on indexation and maturity, and conclude that long 
maturity and issuance of non-indexed debt are not sustainable in 
emerging market countries. This means that such countries generally 
have a higher proportion of the short term maturity debt which leads to a 
higher risk of the debt default. Bussièrea, Fratzschera and Koeniger 
(2004) state that having a large share of foreign currency denominated 
debt creates a currency mismatch, which can worsen a maturity mismatch. 
Borensztein et al. (2005) argue that the debt structure of countries is very 
15 
 
important. They explain that emerging market countries, in particular, 
rely on short term and/or foreign currency debt too much, and this 
exposes them to a high risk of rollover and rapid increase in the debt 
level resulting from depreciations of their domestic currencies. However, 
they note that debt structures towards foreign currency denominated or 
short term debt are necessary for the policy makers in emerging market 
countries. Consequently, these risky debt structures are a symptom rather 
than cause of countries’ inability to have good policies, which may result 
from weak domestic institutions.  
 
2.2.3     Bank loans versus Bond financing 
Hale (2007) investigates the choice of bank loans or bonds, and finds that 
macroeconomic fundamentals affect this choice for private borrowers, 
but not for sovereigns. However, the cost of default is higher for bonds, 
because they usually have multiple creditors and hence, they are much 
more difficult to restructure. The issue becomes even more difficult if the 
bonds were issued under a Unanimity Action Clause (UAC) and not 
under a Collective Action Clause (CAC).
19
 Liquidity is another issue. 
Bank loan contracts often have terms that allow banks to stop their 
financing on relatively short notice. Therefore, we can expect that the 
                                                          
19 See Kletzer (2004) to know more on these clauses. 
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countries that mainly rely on bank loans have more risks of experiencing 
a debt roll-over problem. However, Berger et al. (2005) look at the 
effects of asymmetric information on debt maturity and find that 
borrowing from banks can be a sign of smaller risk of default because 
banks may have advantages in gathering information, renegotiating loans, 
and enforcing other restrictive covenants compared to public markets. 
Similarly, De Fiore and Uhlig (2005) study the difference between bank 
finance and bond finance and find that the Euro area has a larger share of 
bank finance than the U.S. since there is not enough public information 
about firms’ credit worthiness, and banks have a greater advantage in 
obtaining this kind of information. Table 1.1 provides an example of the 
differences in the market instruments and bond and notes among high 
income countries, emerging markets and developing countries. The table 
also provides examples across different geographical locations. 
 
2.2.4     Local currency versus Foreign currency debt 
Currency composition is important, because if the debt is denominated in 
local currency, it can be eliminated through inflation (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2011a). Since developed countries can issue debt in their local currencies, 
they have much less possibility of default. Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2002) have termed this as a problem of “original sin”. They 
17 
 
showed that 68.3 percent of debt in the major financial centres (US dollar, 
Euro, Yen, Pound and Swiss Franc) was denominated in their own 
currencies in 1999-2001, but the same number for developing countries 
was only 2.7 percent. A depreciation of the domestic currency will 
increase the value of the country’s debt denominated in foreign currency. 
Therefore, it is not difficult to see why the composition of the currency 
significantly affects the probability of a debt crisis. For example, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan increased from 50 percent in 1975 
to 75 percent in 1992 due to the country’s primary fiscal deficits. Since 
half of its debt was denominated in foreign currency, the impact of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (and the economic sanctions for the country’s 
nuclear tests imposed by the G8) in 1998 were critical. As a result, 
Pakistan had to restructure both its bank loans and international bonds in 
1999.
20
 Table 1.2 shows that more than 60 per cents of the debts issued 
by the OECD and European countries were denominated in their local 
currency as of December 2001, but the same ratio for the emerging 
economies was only 1.2 percent. 
This is probably one of the main reasons why most researchers are 
interested in developing countries. However, the European sovereign 
debt crisis warned us that the group of developed countries is not 
completely free from the risk of sovereign default. Figure 2 shows that 
                                                          
20 For more details of the debt crisis in Pakistan, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). 
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the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the OECD countries has an upward trend, 
but that ratio in other countries has a downward trend. 
   
 2.2.5     Domestic versus External debt 
 Sovereign debt crisis refers to economic and financial problems caused by 
either perceived or actual inability of independent countries to meet their 
liabilities when they become due. The perception of governments’ 
liabilities is often treated differently by the characteristics of debts. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) distinguish sovereign debt crises based on 
which laws apply to these debts. If domestic laws are applied, these debts 
are domestic debts for that government; otherwise the debts are external 
debts for that government. They define external debt crises as a failure to 
meet a principal or interest payment on the due date including rescheduling 
which results in less favourable terms than the original obligation. In 
addition, domestic debt crises involve the freezing of bank deposits and a 
forcible conversion to local currency in order to cover the events of these 
virtual domestic debt crises. Accordingly, under this definition a domestic 
debt crisis is more closely associated with a banking crisis. Governments 
generally have the power to enforce such things during crisis situations. 
Thus the structure of debt might have different implications for external or 
domestic crises.  
19 
 
 2.2.6     Sovereign debt crisis and its linkage with other financial crises 
 Governments need to borrow money from financial markets instead of 
printing money as discussed earlier, and the banking sector has an 
important role in these settlements. These facts emphasize the importance 
of studying sovereign debt crises in conjunction with the occurrence of 
other financial crises. Candelon and Palm (2010) examine the relationship 
between banking and sovereign debt crises since banking crises leads to a 
deterioration of the government’s budget balance. In addition, banks are 
often the main creditors of governments, and therefore, financial problems 
of the banks can affect governments.
21
  However, Candelon and Palm 
(2010) find that the empirical evidence supporting this linkage is weak. 
Contagion effects from currency crisis to debt crisis are theoretically easy 
to understand because currency depreciation increases the debt burden of 
the government’s debt denominated in foreign currency. Dreher, Herz 
and Karb (2004) review theoretical linkages between currency and debt 
crises, and argue that there are some common factors that cause both. 
First, a negative shock to a country’s demand can cause depreciation 
pressure on its currency. Since a country with a fixed or pegged exchange 
rate has to sell its foreign reserves or raise the interest rate as a defence, it 
worsens the recession, and motivates a government to terminate the peg. 
                                                          
21 See Paoli, Hoggarth and Saporta (2006). 
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Rational investors expect the occurrence of this currency devaluation and 
start withdrawing their capital from the country, and this accelerates the 
currency devaluation. In addition, decreasing demand leads to output and 
employment losses in that country and makes the government’s budget 
balance worse. This increases the probability of debt crisis.  Second, a 
rise in the international interest rate implies that debtor countries have to 
increase their interest payments under free capital mobility in order to 
avoid capital outflows.
22
 A rise in domestic interest rates can decrease 
investments and consumption in the country, and thus lead to a recession, 
which worsens a government’s budget. Third, a political or structural 
problem can lead to investors reassessing the risks of their investments 
and withdrawing their capital or requiring high risk premiums. This 
results in currency devaluation and financial distress for the government. 
 
3 Literature Review 
Studies examining the determinants of sovereign debt crises have looked 
at external debt, and most of these studies focus on emerging markets or 
European countries. Some papers have looked at macroeconomic 
indicators to understand the determinants of debt crises. For example, 
Min (1998) looks at the yield spread of the 11 emerging market countries 
                                                          
22 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for underlying international finance theories.    
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from 1991 to 1995 and finds that macroeconomic indicators, such as 
debt-to-GDP ratio, reserves-to-GDP ratio, domestic inflation rate, terms 
of trade, and real exchange rates are important.
23
 Similarly, Catao and 
Sutton (2002) find that higher volatility of terms of trade and fiscal policy 
variables lead to a higher risk of sovereign debt default. Some other 
papers suggest that political stability is an important factor for sovereign 
debt crisis. Baldacci, Gupta and Mati (2011) investigate the key 
determinants of country risk premiums using panel data of 46 emerging 
market countries from 1997 to 2008 and conclude that fiscal vulnerability 
and political risk are important factors.
24
  Kohlscheen (2010) studies both 
domestic and external debt crises for 53 emerging market countries from 
1980 to 2005. He finds that the previous year’s GDP growth, debt service 
per exports, and parliamentary democracy are significant determinants of 
debt defaults. Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner (2009) analyse sovereign 
bonds’ yield spreads in European countries and find that fiscal 
performance variables such as expected fiscal balance and debt service to 
tax receipts ratio are significant factors. 
Some studies have looked at the issue of public debt management, debt 
structure and sustainability of debt. Jeanne and Guscina (2006) 
                                                          
23 Hilscher and Nosbusch (2004) research yield spreads in 32 emerging market countries from 1994 to 
2002, and they argue that the debt-to-GDP ratio is only meaningful in time series and not in the cross 
section. 
24 They measure the fiscal vulnerability by the overall fiscal balance as a share of GDP and the public 
investment ratio to GDP. The political risk variables are retrieved from the World Bank and the 
Heritage Foundation. 
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investigate the structure of government debt for both domestic and 
external debt in 19 emerging market countries, focusing on debt maturity, 
currency composition and indexation of governments’ debt. Their 
research indicates that debt structures are important variables and that the 
debt structure of Asian countries and advanced economies are similar. 
Das et al. (2010) explain the importance of debt management and 
structure. Their research finds a significant relationship between public 
debt management and financial stability. They argue that debt 
management is more important for emerging market countries, but it has 
now become more relevant in many developed countries with high public 
debt levels since 2008. Contessi (2012) studies sovereign debt 
sustainability and finds that it is potentially unsustainable if the 
difference between long term interest rate and GDP growth rate is 
positive.
25
  
Some studies have used alternative techniques or proxy variables such as 
credit ratings to investigate the risk of debt crises. Using survival analysis, 
Roa, Garcia and Bonilla (2009) investigate 78 countries from 1995 to 
2001 and find that credit rating changes are explained by monetary and 
exchange rate regime variables. They find that crisis depends on financial 
system stability, potential economic growth and domestic political 
support to the government and its policies. These factors affect the 
                                                          
25 He considers the structure of debt and the rollover risk in maintaining a short maturity structure of the 
debt. 
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effectiveness of the country’s monetary policy and affect debt crises by 
putting pressure on exchange rates. Similarly, political and financial 
instability increase risk premiums of sovereign debt because of higher 
uncertainty and reduce the willingness and ability of countries to repay its 
debt. Hence, this worsens the country’s financial conditions. 
Researchers have investigated the link between debt crises and other 
financial crises. Laeven and Valencia (2012) find that 19 out of 66 debt 
crises have occurred within three years of banking crises; and 37 out of 
66 crises were within three years of currency crises, including 8 episodes 
that record the occurrence of all three crises together within that period.
26
 
This surprisingly high proportion of twin crises indicates a strong 
relationship among debt, currency and banking crises. Dreher, Herz and 
Karb (2004) empirically analyse the relationship between currency and 
debt crises by estimating the determinants of each type of crisis 
separately, and then testing for the causality. They find a significant 
contagion effect from currency to debt crises in the same period, but a 
negative effect of lagged (three years) currency crises on debt crises. 
However, Bauer, Herz and Karb (2007) argue that this twin currency and 
debt crises have to be distinguished from both pure currency and pure 
debt crises, and find that this separation improves their model 
significantly and predicts 75 per cent of all debt crises.  
                                                          
26 Frequencies of the banking and currency crises are shown in Figures 11 and 12, respectively. Historical 
occurrences of the combinations of financial crises are also demonstrated graphically in Figure 13.   
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Other studies have used alternative estimation techniques. For example, 
Hansen (2011) and Tong (2010) use a threshold model to understand debt 
crises. Manasse and Roubini (2009) apply a Classification and 
Regression Tree (CART) model to find the thresholds of variables in 
sovereign debt crisis events using a dataset of 47 emerging market 
countries from 1970 to 2002. They find that most debt crises can be 
classified as episodes of insolvency (debt unsustainability), illiquidity or 
macro and exchange rate weakness.
27
 Fioramanti (2008) uses non-
parametric methods based on an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) for 
predicting sovereign debt crises. Using panel data of 46 emerging 
countries between 1980 and 2004, he finds that total external debt and 
GDP growth rate are significant determinants of debt crises.
28
  He argues 
that the ANN methodology shows a good performance for forecasting 
sovereign debt crisis, but does not offer straightforward implications for 
policy makers. These studies find critical values of their variables and 
have achieved relatively high predictability for the out-of-sample crisis 
events. However, these models lack direct implications, as there are no 
coefficients in these models. Hence, direct implications for each 
determinant are hard to obtain.  
                                                          
27 For details of the CART model, see Timofeev (2004). 
28 This paper uses data on external debt only. 
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To summarise, most of the empirical papers find some significant 
macroeconomic factors, but the debt structure variables have not been 
examined carefully in the literature. In this research, I aim to bridge this 
gap. I investigate the impact of different debt structures on the risk of 
debt crises by controlling for the macroeconomic and political variables 
that have been found to be important in the literature.  
 
4 Data and Methodology 
In this section, I explain in detail the variables, the data sources and the 
methodology to investigate the determinants of debt crisis. 
 
4.1     Variables 
As the exact definition of default will always involve some degree of 
arbitrariness, I have collected several measures of debt default and debt 
crises (10 in total) from previous studies. All of these cover different time 
periods and countries, and the definitions of defaults/crises vary among 
these measures. In my results, I report the evidence using the domestic 
and external debt default measures from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b). 
This measure has a wider coverage of countries and time periods, has 
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separate measures for domestic and external crises, is consistent with the 
definitions, and has been used widely in the literature. Hence I view it as 
the best measure. However, I have tested my results with a couple of 
alternative measures as well.
29
  Domestic debt crisis is defined as the 
failure of repayment of principal or interest on the due date for the debt 
issued under domestic legal jurisdiction, and also includes debt 
restructuring which has worse terms than the original terms for creditors, 
deposit freezes and forcible conversion of foreign currency deposits into 
local currency. The external debt crisis involves outright default on 
payment of debt obligations incurred under foreign legal jurisdiction, 
including non-payment, repudiation, or the restructuring of debt into 
terms less favourable to the lender than in the original contract. These 
two debt crises data in Reinhart’s database covers 70 countries and the 
time period is from 1970 to 2010.
30
  
To measure the differences in the debt structure, I consider three 
variables:  maturity of debt, which captures the differences in short term 
versus long term borrowing; the type of debt, which measures the 
government’s borrowing of bank loans vis-à-vis bond financing; and the 
country’s borrowing power overseas, which captures the country’s power 
of financing in the international finance market using its local currency. 
                                                          
29 These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request. 
30 Classifications of total observations are shown in Table 1.3. 
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There are some limitations of the debt structure variables. The data on 
short term borrowing is only available for total external debt and not for 
government external debt, which means that external debt of private 
sectors are included in this variable. On the other hand, the data on bank 
loans and bonds are available for governments. However, there is no 
distinction between external and domestic creditors. Borrowing power 
overseas is calculated by the total debt in international debt market issued 
in that country’s local currency divided by the country’s total external 
debt.
31
 Banking crisis and currency crisis data are retrieved from Laeven 
and Valencia (2012). These data cover 168 countries from 1970 to 2011.  
The control variables used in the analysis are lag of GDP growth, lag of 
inflation, and trade (as a country’s export plus import) per GDP. I use 
lagged values of GDP growth and inflation, because debt crisis may have 
occurred at the beginning of the corresponding year. I also control for the 
exchange rate regimes and political stability.
32
 The exchange rate regime 
variable takes values from 1 to 15. The higher the value, the more 
flexible is the regime. The political stability index is calculated from 
democracy and autocracy levels of the countries. The value for this index 
runs from -10 to 10, and a higher number means that the country is more 
                                                          
31 This calculation is the same as the calculation of “INDEXB” in Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 
(2002), except for the fact that this borrowing power ratio is subtracted from 1 in their paper. 
32 Correlations between explanatory variables are provided in Table 1.4. 
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politically stable. The definitions of all the variables are provided in 
Appendix A1.  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the summary statistics of all the variables for the 
non OECD and OECD countries. The mean and the standard deviation 
are calculated using one country-year pair as one observation. The means 
of domestic and external debt crises for the OECD countries are much 
smaller than those of the non OECD countries. However, the means of 
the banking crisis are not very different between these two groups. Table 
2.3 provides the differences of means test (t-test) for all the variables for 
these two groups. For example, the first row of the table 2.3 indicates that 
the t-statistics 9.882 is sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis of 
no difference in means between the two groups at the 1 percent level (p-
value = 0.000). The results indicate that except for debt maturity and 
banking crisis, the means of explanatory variables are significantly 
different across the two groups of countries. These results describe the 
differences in the characteristics between non OECD and OECD 
countries. I find that the OECD countries have lower GDP growth, 
inflation, central government debt per GDP and bank loans per bonds as 
well as a lower risk of domestic and external debt crisis and currency 
crisis on average. In addition, the OECD countries have higher political 
stability and borrowing power overseas.  
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Similarly, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide the summary statistics of all 
explanatory variables for the sample countries that have not experienced 
domestic debt crisis and for those that have experienced it, respectively. 
As shown in Table 3.2, both the mean and the standard deviation of the 
lag of inflation are extremely high for the samples with domestic debt 
crisis. Table 3.3 suggests that the country that experienced domestic debt 
crisis in the year has lower GDP growth in a previous year, lower short 
term maturity loans, smaller proportion of government bank loans per 
bonds, and lower borrowing power overseas in the same year. It also has 
higher inflation in previous year and central government debt per GDP in 
the same year, and the exchange rate regime is more flexible compared to 
the countries did not experience domestic debt crisis. These results are 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and are supported by the theories 
discussed earlier. Table 3.3 indicates that shifting towards short term 
external debt seems to reduce the risk of the domestic debt crisis. This 
could be due to the fact that it increases the risk of external debt crisis 
instead of the risk of domestic debt crisis. Higher government bank loans 
per bonds are also associated with the lower risk of the domestic debt 
crisis. This supports the theory of Berger et al. (2005), which suggests 
that the banks have an advantage in collecting information and hence are 
better informed to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency.  
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Tables 4.1 through 4.3 provide summary statistics and tests for the 
differences in means across the same groups of countries for the external 
debt crisis. For example, the mean of the inflation and central debt per 
GDP look much higher for the countries that have experienced external 
debt crisis, but their standard deviations are also very high. Table 4.3 
shows that the countries that experienced external debt crises in the year 
have lower GDP growth in a previous year, lower trade per GDP, 
political stability, short term per long term external debt, and borrowing 
power overseas in the same year. However, they have higher inflation in 
a previous year, total central government debt per GDP in the same year, 
and have more flexible exchange rate regimes. These results are 
significant at the 0.1 per cent level. 
 
4.2     Data Sources 
Data on debt maturity and types of debt (bank loans and bonds) has been 
obtained from the Institute of International Finance (IIF) database for the 
period 1978 to 2010. The currency composition data was obtained from 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database, and is calculated 
by the method used in Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panniza (2002). The 
data on banking and currency crises is from Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
The data on domestic debt crisis and external debt crisis events are from 
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b). The definitions of domestic and external 
debt crises used in their paper are also consistent with internationally 
recognised definitions such as Standard and Poor’s. The government 
debt-to-GDP and exchange rate regime data have been taken from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), and the former has been supplemented with 
data from the OECD library and the WDI. Political stability data was 
obtained from the Polity IV project. The detailed definitions of the data 
can be found in Appendix A1.
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4.3     Empirical Methodology 
To measure the risks of the sovereign debt crisis, I estimate a model with 
the commonly used logit regression analysis. The logit regression 
analysis is suitable when a dependent variable takes a binary form; which 
in this case, ‘default’ or ‘no default’. Since the propensity to default is an 
unobserved variable    such that 
          
where    is the error term that follows a logistic function and   is the set 
of independent variables. We do not observe the propensity to default for 
                                                          
33 Appendix A2 provides the list of countries and number of observations used in this research. 
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a country, only whether the country has defaulted or not. Therefore, the 
observation is  
            
             
The probability that     is  
                          
           
In a logit model, the grouped data usually consists on counts or 
proportions. The observed dependent variable consists of the proportion 
    of the    countries who respond with      , i.e. an occurrence of a 
crisis  in year   described by the following equation. The observed     is 
an estimate of the population quantity       
    . From the logistic 
function, we have 
   
         
           
 
and,  
   
  
    
       
The logit function is estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure and 
the log-likelihood function is given by 
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     ∑  
 
   
         
                    
       
The logistic distribution has slightly flatter tails than the normal 
distribution. Since a sovereign debt crisis is a rare event, the distribution 
will be skewed towards right. Hence, the logit analysis is preferable to 
the probit analysis as the distribution is more likely to be a logistic 
distribution rather than the standard normal. Thus, the logit regression is 
more appropriate for analysing sovereign debt crises.
34
  
 
5 Results and Implications 
The regression results are explained in two different sections. Section 5.1 
discusses results of the domestic debt crisis, and Section 5.2 explains the 
results for the external debt crisis.  
 
5.1    Results for Domestic Debt Crisis 
Table 5.1 shows the result of regressions for the domestic debt crisis. 
Column 1 is a baseline model where the domestic debt crisis variable is 
                                                          
34 Alternatively, some studies have used survival analysis to predict sovereign debt crisis. However, I 
have not considered survival analysis in this research. 
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regressed on the different macroeconomic variables. Column 2 reports 
the regression results of the debt maturity on domestic debt crisis. 
Column 3 reports the results of government bank loans per bonds, which 
describe the type of government debt. Column 4 represents the results of 
the country’s borrowing power overseas that measures the country’s 
financing power in domestic currency internationally. Since the number 
of observations varies significantly across the columns, one must be 
cautious in interpreting and comparing the results between the columns. 
All debt structure variables are significant at the 10 percent level. The 
currency composition variable is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Column 2 shows the negative effects of the ratio of short term to long 
term debt on the domestic debt crisis. This implies that the risk of debt 
crisis declines as the maturity of debts shifts towards short term lending. 
Since the maturity variables are obtained only for external debt crisis, 
increasing external short term debt increases the risk of the external debt 
crisis. This may lead to a lower probability of the occurrence of the 
domestic debt crisis. Alternatively, the external short term debt burden 
may be reduced when a country experiences a domestic debt crisis. This 
result is significant at the 10 percent level, and the coefficient suggests 
that a 100 percent increase in the short term to long term debt ratio 
reduces the risk of domestic debt crisis by approximately 5 per cent on 
average, holding all other variables constant.  
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In Column 3, the regression of the total government bank loans to 
government bonds ratio indicates significance at the 5 percent level. An 
increase in bank loans compared to bonds may suggest a lower risk of the 
government’s debt because banks monitor the risk of their borrowers 
carefully and finance only when the borrowers appear to be solvent. The 
coefficient implies that a 100 percent increase in total government bank 
loans to bond ratio results in approximately 0.2 per cent decrease in the 
chance of the domestic debt crisis on average. This may suggest that the 
bank loans are economically not significant. 
The result of the borrowing power overseas variable is reported in 
Column 4. The variable is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
coefficient suggests that an increase in the ratio of borrowing power 
reduces the risk of the domestic debt crisis. As the borrowing power of 
the country using its local currency increases, the risk of the debt crisis 
should decrease due to the government’s power of taxation on its 
residents and issuance of its own currency. The coefficient of the 
borrowing power is considerably small due to the high variation of the 
values in the sample countries. For example, the borrowing power of 
Switzerland is 203.11 in 1993, but that of Brazil is only 0.0002 in 1999. 
Even though the result supports the theory, the results do not seem to be 
economically significant. 
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Table 5.2 reports regression results of the debt structure variables with 
interaction terms. Interactions of maturity and type (bank loans versus 
bonds), maturity and currency composition (borrowing power overseas), 
and type and currency composition are examined. Column 1 shows the 
effects of the interaction term of maturity and debt type on the domestic 
debt crisis. The results suggest that both short term to long term debt ratio 
and total government bank loans to bonds ratio are negative and have a 
stronger effect than in Table 5.1. The interaction term is positive and 
significant. This implies that shifting towards short term debt or bank 
loans reduce the risk of domestic debt, but higher ratio of holding short 
term bank loans increase the risk of the crisis. Since bank loans are 
relatively easy to be terminated, or since refinancing is more sensitive to 
the changes in market conditions, relying on short term bank loans 
suggests that the government has a higher rollover risk. This is consistent 
with some of the debt crises phenomena during the 1990s. 
Column 2 is the regression of the interaction of maturity and currency 
composition terms. The result indicates that the borrowing power 
overseas has a significantly negative effect at the 10 percent level.  This 
suggests that the currency composition is an important determinant of the 
risk of the domestic debt crisis. A 100 percent increase in the variable 
reduces the risk of domestic debt crisis by 8 percent on average. Column 
3 shows the regression result of the interaction between the type and 
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currency compositions of the debts. I find that the variable is not 
significant at the 10 percent level.     
Table 5.3 includes the “Banking crisis in previous 2 years” dummy 
variable as an additional control variable. The results of regressions are 
slightly different when the banking crisis experience is taken into account. 
Column 2 indicates that debt maturity and type of debt are both 
statistically significant with correct signs. However, Column 4 shows that 
the borrowing power overseas is not significant in the regressions.  This 
suggests that a country’s borrowing power overseas is less important if 
the country has a recent history of banking crises since countries might 
be unable to borrow in their domestic currency. However, maturity and 
composition of debt get much more attention. The banking crisis itself 
has a positive significant effect in all specifications except in Column 4. 
Experiencing a banking crisis within the past two years increases the risk 
of the domestic debt crisis by 5 to 11 percent on average. 
Similar results are obtained in Table 5.4 when controlled for the previous 
history of the currency crisis. The borrowing power has no significant 
effect when the previous currency crisis experience is considered. 
However, the maturity of debt has stronger negative effects. Shifting 
towards bank loans has a smaller impact than before, which is similar to 
the result with the banking crisis experience.  
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Since the sample countries in this research include both developed and 
developing countries, separating these countries can provide us a better 
understanding of the determinants of the risks of the debt crisis. Table 5.5 
presents regression results of debt structure variables with an OECD 
dummy variable. The results indicate that the OECD countries have a 
significantly lower risk for domestic debt crisis in most specifications.   
Table 5.6 shows the effects of debt structure with an OECD dummy 
variable and its interaction with banking and currency crises.
35
 The 
conclusion is the same. The OECD countries have a lower risk for 
domestic debt crisis, and these effects are significant at the 1 percent 
level.  
 
5.2    Results for External Debt Crisis 
This section focuses on the determinants for external debt crisis. Table 
5.7 shows the impact of the debt structure on the external debt crisis. The 
results suggest that the effects of the debt structure variables on the 
external debt crisis are different from the effects on the domestic debt 
crisis. The maturity and the type of debt variables are not significant 
factors in determining the risks of external debt crisis, but borrowing 
                                                          
35 Turkey is the only OECD country in the sample that had experienced either domestic or external debt 
crisis. 
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power overseas is a significant factor. Its negative coefficient means that 
increasing the borrowing power overseas reduces the probability of 
external debt crisis. If the local currency borrowing power of a country 
increases, the risk of an external debt crisis is reduced. This analysis 
supports the fact that very few developed countries have experienced 
external debt crisis. The maturity variable is not significant, and its sign 
is opposite to that of the domestic debt case. This proves the validity of 
the hypothesis made in the previous section. An increase in the external 
short term debt reduces the risk of the domestic debt crisis.  
Table 5.8 examines the impact of the interaction terms of the debt 
structure variables. Even though the signs of the interaction terms are as 
predicted, none of the terms turn out to be significant.  The results in 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the impact of the previous banking and 
currency crises on external debt crises. The borrowing power overseas 
variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in both tables. 
The banking crises and the currency variables are positive and 
statistically significant in most specifications. 
I investigate the differences between the OECD and non OECD countries 
in Tables 5.11 and 5.12.  Although the OECD dummy variable is 
significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in Table 5.11, the 
debt structure variables are not significant except for the interaction term 
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of the OECD and the maturity of the debt in Column 2. This indicates 
that a shift towards short term debt increases the risk of the external debt 
crisis when the country is an OECD member. Table 5.12 suggests that the 
OECD countries have a lower risk of the external debt crisis, and 
previous currency crisis is more important than banking crisis in these 
countries. 
From these results, it is evident that the debt structure and the previous 
experience of the banking and currency crises are significant 
determinants of debt crises. The results also show that the debt structure 
variables are more important for domestic debt crises than the external 
crises. A detailed summary of all the results are provided in Table 7. 
 
6 Robustness Analysis  
Since most of the debt crises are observed in developing countries, there 
is an argument that using crisis as a dependent variable causes some 
biases.
36
 For example, if all debt crises are observed in the developing 
countries, the results of regressions reflect the impact on developing 
countries more than on the developed countries. To resolve this issue, I 
use credit ratings as a new dependent variable as a proxy for the risk of 
                                                          
36 See King and Zeng (2001) for the issues regarding the use of rare events as a dependent variable. 
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debt crises. Using credit ratings as a dependent variable allows a greater 
time series variation for changes in the risk level. This helps to overcome 
the issue of the shortage of events in developed countries. 
First, I use the level of the foreign currency long term (FCLT) credit 
ratings from Standard & Poor’s from 1978 to 2010 as the dependent 
variable. The ratings are transformed to numerical values from 0 (SD) to 
20 (AAA), and only the ratings at the end of each year are measured.
37
 
Accordingly, the ratings in the observations of this study do not capture 
the change if a country experienced upgrading at the beginning of one 
year and downgrading to the original rating by the end of that year. I use 
OLS with White’s heteroscedasticity correction for all the tables. The 
explanatory variables used in the debt structure regressions are lagged 
values of the following variables: GDP growth, inflation, trade-to-GDP, 
exchange rate regime, political stability, and central government debt per 
GDP.
38
 The results of the level of credit ratings are explained in Section 
6.1. In Section 6.2, the same effects are reported when the dependent 
variable is the change in the credit ratings.  
 
 
                                                          
37 The numerical value assigned to each rating is available in Appendix A3. 
38 See Cantor and Packer (1996) for additional details. 
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6.1    Effects of debt structure on the level of credit ratings 
Table 6.1 shows the impact of debt structure variables on the level of 
foreign currency long term (FCLT) debt credit ratings. I use one year lag 
of all control and debt structure variables. Since credit ratings can be 
observed any time during the year, one year lag variables are appropriate 
to use to avoid the arguments of causality.
39
 Table 6.1 shows that all debt 
structure variables are positive and statistically significant, especially 
maturity and borrowing power overseas, which are significant at the 1 
percent level. This indicates that short term maturity, bank loans and 
higher borrowing power overseas improve the credit ratings of the FCLT 
debt. The results show that debt structure has a strong impact on the 
credit ratings of the FCLT debt.  
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are the regressions with banking crisis and currency 
crisis experience, respectively. Significance patterns of the debt structure 
variables are similar to those of Table 6.1. All debt structure variables are 
significant and have positive coefficients. In addition, both banking and 
currency crisis experience variables are significant. In particular, the 
currency crisis experience indicates that it has an extreme impact on the 
FCLT debt.  
                                                          
39 Generally, credit ratings are reviewed by the factors listed in the explanatory variables, and therefore, 
there are some time lags for those factors to be reflected in the ratings. 
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Tables 6.4 through Tables 6.6 present the regressions results for the level 
of credit ratings for local currency long term (LCLT) debt. In Table 6.4, 
the borrowing power overseas variable is significant at the 1 percent level 
and type of debt at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that maturity 
structure is less important for the LCLT debt compared to the FCLT debt, 
but the type of debt and the borrowing power are important in both cases. 
When regressions include banking and currency crisis experience, the 
type of debt, as expected, seems to be less important. The borrowing 
power overseas still remains significant at the 1 percent level. Past 
experiences of banking crises are less important for the LCLT debt. 
However, currency crisis experience is still significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
Overall, the results support the fact that the debt structure variables and 
previous crises history are important determinants of risk of sovereign 
debt for a country as measured by FCLT debt or LCLT debt. 
 
6.2    Effects of debt structure on the change of credit ratings 
In this section, I explain the results of debt structure on the changes in 
credit ratings as an alternative specification for robustness. Tables 6.7 
through 6.9 report the results for the FCLT debt. The results indicate that 
the maturity structure is the most important determinant of FCLT 
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changes. I also find that the banking crisis variable is a significant 
determinant of these changes.  
Tables 6.10 through 6.12 report the results for the changes in credit 
ratings for local currency long term (LCLT) debt. The results suggest that 
the borrowing power overseas variable is the most significant 
determinant of the LCLT changes. Table 6.11 indicates that the type of 
debt is important when previous banking crises are taken into account. 
Having higher bank loans relative to bonds leads to a downgrading of the 
LCLT debt. These results imply that a higher proportion of bank loans 
positively affect the level of the LCLT debt when the country is in a 
normal situation, but it has negative effects when a banking crisis occurs.  
The banking crisis experience also has negative coefficients in all 
specifications in Table 6.11, and all of them are significant at the 1 
percent level. Hence, the banking crisis experience in the past two years 
significantly downgrades the LCLT debt. This effect is similar to the 
effect on FCLT debt (Table 6.8), but the significance is higher in the 
LCLT debt. Table 6.12 suggests that previous currency crisis experience 
does not significantly affect the probability of downgrading the LCLT 
debt.  
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Overall, I find strong evidence that debt structure affects the level of both 
FCLT and LCLT debts, but weak evidence of the effects on the changes 
in credit ratings.  
 
7 Conclusion 
Theoretical studies of sovereign debt crisis suggest the importance of 
analysing different debt structures to understand the inherent risks. In this 
research, the impact of the maturity (short term versus long term), the 
composition type (bank loans versus bonds), and the currency 
compositions (local versus foreign currency) are empirically examined 
using the samples of both developed and developing countries. The 
results indicate that all the debt structure variables have significant effects 
on the domestic debt crisis. I find that the borrowing power overseas, 
which is employed as a measure of the currency composition, is a strong 
indicator of both domestic and external debt crises. Higher borrowing 
power overseas significantly reduces the risk of both types of debt crises 
in our samples. These results are robust to using the levels and changes of 
the S&P’s FCLT and LCLT debt credit ratings as alternative dependent 
variables. 
Furthermore, the connection between a sovereign debt crisis on the one 
hand and banking and currency crises on the other are examined. The 
46 
 
results suggest the existence of strong relationships between these crises, 
particularly between the domestic debt and banking crises, and the 
external debt and currency crises. This supports the theories and the 
arguments in previous studies. The significance of these relationships is 
also robust in most of the specifications employed in this paper.  
 
8 Limitations 
There are some limitations of this research. The data of the maturity and 
the type of debts are only available from 1978 to 2007, and the exact 
currency compositions of each country are limited to a considerably 
small number of countries. Hence, the borrowing power overseas is 
calculated as a proxy of the currency compositions. Since this variable 
has no separations for the issuance of the debt securities by country, this 
measure is only a proxy of the currency compositions of the country, 
which reflects the country’s potential power to borrow in the 
international financial markets.
40
 Additionally, compositions of the 
country’s debt are also scant for a broad range of countries. Data on 
domestic debt are not available in the financial databases as noted by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b).  
                                                          
40 This proxy measure is also limited to the period from 1993 to 2010 and to 29 countries. The list of 
these samples is introduced in Appendix A4. 
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Tables and Graphs 
Figure 1: Frequency of Domestic and External Debt Crises 
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Note: The y-axis shows the frequency of each crisis 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff  (2011b) 
 
Figure 2: Central Government Debt-to-GDP for OECD and Non-OECD countries 
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Note: The y-axis shows the percentage of central government debt to GDP 
Source: WDI 
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Figure 3: Trade-to-GDP of Caribbean and Non-Caribbean countries 
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  Note: The y-axis shows the percentage of trade to GDP 
Source: WDI 
 
Figure 4: Domestic Debt Crisis and Maturity of External Debt 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
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Figure 5: External Debt Crisis and Maturity of External Debt 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
 
Figure 6: Domestic Debt Crisis and Type of Debts 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
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Figure 7: External Debt Crisis and Type of Debts 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
 
Figure 8: Domestic Debt Crisis and Borrowing Power Overseas 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
 
  
56 
 
Figure 9: External Debt Crisis and Borrowing Power Overseas 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and IIF 
 
Figure 10: Total Debt/GDP and Domestic Debt/GDP from 1900 - 2010 
                                  
                        
 
 
 
 
 
      Year 
Note: The y-axis shows the percentage of each debt to GDP 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a) 
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Figure 11: Frequency of Banking Crisis from 1970 - 2011 
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Note: The y-axis shows the frequency of banking crisis 
Source: Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
 
Figure 12: Frequency of Currency Crisis from 1970 – 2011 
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Note: The y-axis shows the frequency of currency crisis 
Source: Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
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Figure 13: Debt Crises, Currency Crises, and Banking Crises 
 
 
 
Source: Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
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Table 1.1: Type of Debt issued in international markets in 2001 
 
Source: Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) 
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Table 1.2: Currency Composition of Debt issued in international markets in 2001 
 
Source: Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) 
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Table 1.3: Classifications of Total Observations 
OECD Observations Percent
0 1,501 63.98
1 845 36.02
Total 2,346 100.00  
Note: A country is a member of OECD = 1 
 
 
Domestic Debt Crisis Observations Percent
0 2,247 95.78
1 99 4.22
Total 2,346 100.00  
Note: A country experienced Domestic Crisis in that year = 1 
 
 
External Debt Crisis Observations Percent
0 1,905 81.20
1 441 18.80
Total 2,346 100.00  
Note: A country experienced External Crisis in that year = 1 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for Non OECD countries 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Domestic Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 1501 0.065 0.247 0 1
External Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 1501 0.291 0.454 0 1
Lag of GDP growth (%) 1448 3.759 4.732 -26.479 22.593
Lag of inflation (%) 1447 76.397 608.247 -27.049 13611.630
Trade per GDP (%) 1445 70.346 56.540 0.309 460.471
Exchange rate regime 1445 8.556 4.049 1 15
Political stability 1486 1.800 6.637 -9 10
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 1066 62.909 78.874 3.194 1209.303
Short term / Long term total external debt 731 0.284 0.432 0.011 7.469
Government bank loans / bonds 600 7.277 17.915 0.007 218.952
Borrowing power overseas 252 0.146 0.314 0 1.692
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 1501 0.108 0.310 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 1501 0.155 0.362 0 1  
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for OECD countries 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Domestic Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 845 0.001 0.034 0 1
External Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 845 0.005 0.069 0 1
Lag of GDP growth (%) 838 2.621 2.599 -8.539 10.917
Lag of inflation (%) 838 7.617 12.720 -6.382 137.965
Trade per GDP (%) 842 66.722 31.932 9.102 183.430
Exchange rate regime 845 8.160 4.246 1 14
Political stability 798 9.630 1.230 -5 10
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 705 46.436 29.622 4.475 189.141
Short term / Long term total external debt 79 0.298 0.175 0.110 1.103
Government bank loans / bonds 70 0.981 1.008 0.028 5.490
Borrowing power overseas 279 3.491 16.318 0 203.113
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 845 0.096 0.295 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 845 0.062 0.240 0 1  
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Table 2.3: Test of difference in means for Non OECD and OECD countries 
T-stat Pr ( T < t ) Pr ( |T| > |t| ) Pr ( T > t )
Domestic Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 9.882 1.000 0.000 0.000
External Debt Crisis (1 = crisis) 23.937 1.000 0.000 0.000
Lag of GDP growth (%) 7.416 1.000 0.000 0.000
Lag of inflation (%) 4.300 1.000 0.000 0.000
Trade per GDP (%) 1.959 0.975 0.050 0.025
Exchange rate regime 2.190 0.986 0.029 0.014
Political stability -44.091 0.000 0.000 1.000
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 6.191 1.000 0.000 0.000
Short term / Long term total external debt -0.541 0.294 0.589 0.706
Government bank loans / bonds 8.495 1.000 0.000 0.000
Borrowing power overseas -3.424 0.000 0.001 1.000
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 0.934 0.825 0.350 0.175
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 7.505 1.000 0.000 0.000  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the sample that has not experienced domestic debt crisis 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Lag of GDP growth (%) 2190 3.414 3.975 -26.479 22.593
Lag of inflation (%) 2189 35.688 359.190 -27.049 12338.660
Trade per GDP (%) 2189 69.300 49.425 0.309 460.471
Exchange rate regime 2201 8.321 4.118 1 15
Political stability 2185 4.554 6.640 -9 10
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 1688 54.790 52.779 3.194 898.607
Short term / Long term total external debt 777 0.290 0.421 0.011 7.469
Government bank loans / bonds 637 6.784 17.462 0.007 218.952
Borrowing power overseas 515 1.962 12.117 0 203.113
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 2247 0.097 0.296 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 2247 0.111 0.314 0 1  
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the sample that has experienced domestic debt crisis 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Lag of GDP growth (%) 96 1.698 6.391 -24.700 11.200
Lag of inflation (%) 96 404.256 1598.786 -3.648 13611.630
Trade per GDP (%) 98 62.554 36.831 6.320 178.994
Exchange rate regime 89 10.596 3.713 1 15
Political stability 99 4.131 4.672 -8 9
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 83 88.109 177.076 15.202 1209.303
Short term / Long term total external debt 33 0.178 0.133 0.051 0.646
Government bank loans / bonds 33 3.433 4.099 0.049 17.201
Borrowing power overseas 16 0.014 0.012 0 0.053
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 99 0.253 0.437 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 99 0.364 0.483 0 1  
 
 
Table 3.3: Test of difference in means for the samples with and without domestic debt crisis 
T-stat Pr ( T < t ) Pr ( |T| > |t| ) Pr ( T > t )
Lag of GDP growth (%) 2.608 0.995 0.011 0.005
Lag of inflation (%) -2.256 0.013 0.026 0.987
Trade per GDP (%) 1.744 0.958 0.084 0.042
Exchange rate regime -5.639 0.000 0.000 1.000
Political stability 0.862 0.805 0.390 0.195
Total central government debt per GDP (%) -1.711 0.046 0.091 0.955
Short term / Long term total external debt 4.039 1.000 0.000 0.000
Government bank loans / bonds 3.372 1.000 0.001 0.001
Borrowing power overseas 3.648 1.000 0.000 0.000
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -3.508 0.000 0.001 1.000
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -5.155 0.000 0.000 1.000  
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the sample that has not experienced external debt crisis 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Lag of GDP growth (%) 1874 3.721 3.621 -12.900 22.593
Lag of inflation (%) 1874 13.332 70.429 -27.049 2545.452
Trade per GDP (%) 1876 70.571 51.686 0.979 460.471
Exchange rate regime 1886 8.246 3.925 1 15
Political stability 1854 5.201 6.415 -9 10
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 1516 47.934 30.196 3.194 190.980
Short term / Long term total external debt 611 0.309 0.451 0.011 7.469
Government bank loans / bonds 487 6.744 19.648 0.007 218.952
Borrowing power overseas 507 1.993 12.210 0 203.113
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 1905 0.092 0.289 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 1905 0.084 0.277 0 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the sample that has experienced external debt crisis 
 
Obs. Mean Stdev. Min Max
Lag of GDP growth (%) 412 1.617 5.556 -26.479 18.287
Lag of inflation (%) 411 223.710 1119.021 -23.479 13611.630
Trade per GDP (%) 411 61.890 32.991 0.309 198.767
Exchange rate regime 404 9.173 4.892 1 15
Political stability 430 1.667 6.447 -9 10
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 255 106.397 143.507 18.493 1209.303
Short term / Long term total external debt 199 0.213 0.257 0.022 1.919
Government bank loans / bonds 183 6.287 6.271 0.065 35.662
Borrowing power overseas 24 0.008 0.009 0 0.031
Banking crisis in previous 2 years 441 0.154 0.362 0 1
Currency crisis in previous 2 years 441 0.283 0.451 0 1  
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Table 4.3: Test of difference in means for the sample with and without external debt crisis 
T-stat Pr ( T < t ) Pr ( |T| > |t| ) Pr ( T > t )
Lag of GDP growth (%) 7.353 1.000 0.000 0.000
Lag of inflation (%) -3.810 0.000 0.000 1.000
Trade per GDP (%) 4.302 1.000 0.000 0.000
Exchange rate regime -3.572 0.000 0.000 1.000
Political stability 10.250 1.000 0.000 0.000
Total central government debt per GDP (%) -6.481 0.000 0.000 1.0000
Short term / Long term total external debt 3.733 1.000 0.000 0.000
Government bank loans / bonds 0.456 0.676 0.649 0.324
Borrowing power overseas 3.662 1.000 0.000 0.000
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -3.379 0.000 0.001 1.000
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -8.902 0.000 0.000 1.000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
68 
 
                     Table 5.1 Debt Structure and Domestic Debt Crisis 
  
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.002470** -0.001980 -0.002060 -5.06e-13 
 
(-2.25) (-1.47) (-1.36) (-0.38) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000003 -6.77e-14 
 
(0.56) (-0.92) (-0.78) (-0.86) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000247** -0.000179 -0.000173 -4.05e-13** 
 
(-2.17) (-0.82) (-0.63) (-2.10) 
Exchange rate regime 0.004130*** 0.003930** 0.003650* 3.78e-12 
 
(3.27) (2.09) (1.76) (1.54) 
Political stability -0.000449 -0.000035 -0.001350 -1.65e-12 
 
(-0.98) (-0.04) (-1.34) (-1.49) 
Total central government 
debt per GDP (%) 0.000087** 0.000198 0.000422*** 3.56e-13*** 
 
(2.50) (1.45) (2.84) (2.94) 
Short term / Long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.052100* 
  
  
(-1.88) 
  
Total government bank loans 
/ bonds 
  
-0.002330** 
 
  
 
(-2.11) 
 
Borrowing power overseas 
 
  -1.21e-10*** 
  
  
(-4.00) 
Log likelihood -300.20 -104.00 -100.20 -34.22 
Pseudo R squared 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.39 
AIC 614.40 223.90 216.30 84.44 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
     Notes:  Marginal effects are shown; t statistics in parentheses 
                         * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
           For explanation of the coefficients of Column 4, refer to Section 5.1 
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Table 5.2: Debt Structure with interaction terms 
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.001470 -0.000485 -0.000264 
 
(-1.11) (-0.39) (-0.48) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.000003 -0.000079 -0.000036 
 
(-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.89) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000156 -0.000282 -0.000139 
 
(-0.70) (-1.24) (-1.26) 
Exchange rate regime 0.003860** 0.003320** 0.001080 
 
(2.36) (2.06) (1.47) 
Political stability -0.001350 -0.001310 -0.001240 
 
(-1.56) (-1.18) (-1.53) 
Total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.000264* 0.000256 0.000197 
 
(1.76) (1.64) (1.47) 
Short term / Long term total 
external debt (A) -0.075100*** -0.024400 
 
 
(-2.66) (-1.08) 
 Total government bank loans 
/ bonds (B) -0.003170*** 
 
-0.003430 
 
(-2.67) 
 
(-1.53) 
Borrowing power overseas (C) 
 
-0.079800* -0.037800 
  
(-1.78) (-1.36) 
(A) x (B) 0.003790*** 
  
 
(2.97) 
  (A) x (C) 
 
0.066900 
 
  
(0.85) 
 (B) x (C) 
  
0.015900 
   
(1.07) 
Log likelihood -96.40 -32.94 -26.76 
Pseudo R squared 0.16 0.31 0.42 
AIC 212.80 85.89 73.52 
Number of observations 576 246 207 
    Notes:  See Table 5.1 
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Table 5.3: Debt Structure and Domestic Debt Crises with Banking Crisis 
 
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.001820* -0.000668 -0.000406 5.54e-10 
 
(-1.76) (-0.83) (-0.40) (0.23) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 -4.98e-13 
 
(0.36) (-1.08) (-0.74) (-0.05) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000223** -0.000101 -0.000032 -2.20e-10 
 
(-2.14) (-0.74) (-0.17) (-0.21) 
Exchange rate regime 0.003940*** 0.00264** 0.00291** 1.50e-09 
 
(3.37) (2.19) (1.99) (0.22) 
Political stability -0.000325 -0.000247 -0.000897 -6.76e-10 
 
(-0.75) (-0.46) (-1.38) (-0.20) 
Total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.000077** 0.000063 0.000204* 2.21e-10 
 
(2.34) (0.67) (1.83) (0.21) 
Short term / Long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.048300** 
  
  
(-2.08) 
  Total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.001760* 
 
   
(-1.94) 
 
Borrowing power overseas 
   
-3.83e-08 
    
(-0.23) 
Banking crisis in previous 2 
years (d) 0.046300*** 0.085600*** 0.107000*** 7.92e-08 
 
(2.68) (2.70) (2.98) (0.20) 
Log likelihood -294.70 -90.72 -87.26 -27.42 
Pseudo R squared 0.09 0.25 0.24 0.51 
AIC 605.30 199.40 192.50 72.84 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
     
            Notes:  Marginal effects are shown; t statistics in parentheses  
           (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1   
           * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    
           For explanation of the coefficients of Column 4, refer to Section 5.1 
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Table 5.4 Debt Structure and Domestic Debt Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.001480 -0.001030 -0.001100 -8.38e-11 
 
(-1.35) (-1.01) (-0.81) (-0.11) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000004 -0.000001 -0.000001 -4.25e-11 
 
(1.14) (-0.30) (-0.15) (-0.16) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000236** -0.000152 -0.000149 -1.85e-10 
 
(-2.05) (-0.87) (-0.57) (-0.15) 
Exchange rate regime 0.002740** 0.002080 0.001960 3.71e-10 
 
(2.44) (1.55) (1.17) (0.16) 
Political stability 0.000025 -0.000070 -0.001060 -5.23e-10 
 
(0.05) (-0.10) (-1.14) (-0.15) 
Total central government 
debt per GDP (%) 0.000057* 0.000147 0.000363*** 1.02e-10 
 
(1.66) (1.25) (2.66) (0.16) 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
 
-0.060400** 
  
  
(-2.27) 
  Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
  
-0.001970* 
 
   
(-1.92) 
 Borrowing power 
overseas 
   
-2.64e-08 
    
(-0.17) 
Currency crisis in 
previous 2 years (d) 0.057900*** 0.056000** 0.059900** 7.13e-08 
 
(3.11) (2.40) (2.44) (0.15) 
Log likelihood -292.10 -97.70 -95.32 -28.72 
Pseudo R squared 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.49 
AIC 600.20 213.40 208.60 75.45 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
 
  
                     Notes:  See Table 5.3   
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Table 5.5: Debt Structure and Domestic Debt Crisis with OECD dummy 
 
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.000840* -0.00174 -0.00182 
 
(-1.80) (-1.39) (-1.32) 
Lag of inflation (%) -1.45e-08 
-
0.00000349 
-
0.00000311 
 
(-0.01) (-0.92) (-0.76) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000106* -0.000140 -0.0000892 
 
(-1.88) (-0.72) (-0.34) 
Exchange rate regime 0.00168** 0.00399** 0.00387* 
 
(2.06) (2.27) (1.94) 
Political stability 0.000799** 0.000113 -0.00104 
 
(2.25) (0.15) (-1.11) 
Total central government debt per GDP (%) 0.0000250* 0.000144 0.000347** 
 
(1.67) (1.17) (2.43) 
OECD (d) (A) -0.0644*** 0.00281 -0.0211* 
 
(-7.09) (0.10) (-1.72) 
Short term / Long term total external debt (B) 
 
-0.0442* 
 
  
(-1.88) 
 
Total government bank loans / bonds (C) 
  
-0.00232** 
   
(-2.17) 
(A) x (B) 
 
-0.141** 
 
  
(-2.36) 
 (A) x (C) 
  
-0.00658 
   
(-1.36) 
Log likelihood -261.4 -102.6 -98.84 
Pseudo R squared 0.191 0.148 0.140 
AIC 538.7 225.1 217.7 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 
    Notes: See Table 5.3 
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   Table 5.6: Financial Crises and Domestic Debt Crisis with OECD dummy 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
 Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.00000989* -0.00000680 
 
 
(-1.73) (-1.36) 
 Lag of inflation (%) -6.98e-10 7.14e-09 
 
 
(-0.04) (0.49) 
 Trade per GDP (%) -0.00000145** -0.00000115* 
 
 
(-2.25) (-1.70) 
 Exchange rate regime 0.0000247*** 0.0000143* 
 
 
(3.02) (1.84) 
 Political stability 0.0000118*** 0.00000921* 
 
 
(2.81) (1.90) 
 Total central government debt per 
GDP (%) 0.000000330* 0.000000205 
 
 
(1.81) (1.34) 
 OECD (d) (A) -0.106*** -0.0830*** 
 
 
(-7.17) (-6.94) 
 Banking crisis in previous 2 years (d) 
(B) 0.000215* 
  
 
(1.79) 
  Currency crisis in previous 2 years (d) 
(C) 
 
0.000148 
 
  
(1.48) 
 (A) x (B) 0.993*** 
  
 
(121.41) 
  (A) x (C) 
 
0.996*** 
 
  
(182.40) 
 
Log likelihood -255.5 -255.4 
 Pseudo R squared 0.209 0.210 
 AIC 530.9 530.8 
 Number of observations 1712 1712 
 
    Notes:  See Table 5.3 
 
 
 
  
  
74 
 
               Table 5.7: Debt Structure and External Debt Crises 
 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.009070*** -0.014900*** -0.012100** -1.11e-15 
 
(-3.40) (-3.36) (-2.23) (-0.47) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.001150 0.000865 0.000987 4.13e-16 
 
(0.90) (0.63) (0.64) (1.56) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000605*** -0.000841 -0.000159 -1.24e-15** 
 
(-3.10) (-1.25) (-0.19) (-2.01) 
Exchange rate regime 0.011800*** 0.017300*** 0.019600*** 1.14e-14* 
 
(4.04) (3.11) (2.88) (1.72) 
Political stability -0.005190*** 0.002250 -0.004800 -3.36e-15 
 
(-3.55) (0.71) (-1.39) (-1.34) 
Total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.002820*** 0.005540*** 0.007430*** 1.00e-15*** 
 
(3.84) (3.57) (3.59) (3.24) 
Short term / Long term total 
external debt 
 
0.045100 
  
  
(0.68) 
  Total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.000118 
 
   
(-0.12) 
 
Borrowing power overseas 
   
-4.10e-13*** 
    
(-5.06) 
Log likelihood -542.40 -274.20 -226.80 -41.13 
Pseudo R squared 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.53 
AIC 1098.80 564.40 469.50 98.25 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
                                                         Notes:  See Table 5.1 
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Table 5.8: External Debt Crises with interaction terms 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.012100** -0.000288 -0.000499 
 
(-2.22) (-0.38) (-0.47) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000996 0.000118 0.000170 
 
(0.64) (0.78) (0.88) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000153 -0.000277 -0.000551 
 
(-0.18) (-1.15) (-1.58) 
Exchange rate regime 0.019200*** 0.003670** 0.003960* 
 
(2.83) (2.09) (1.66) 
Political stability -0.004840 -0.000896 -0.002720* 
 
(-1.40) (-1.16) (-1.76) 
Total central government debt per 
GDP (%) 0.007520*** 0.000214 0.000585 
 
(3.49) (1.37) (1.52) 
Short term / Long term total external 
debt (A) 0.026100 -0.045100 
 
 
(0.32) (-1.15) 
 Total government bank loans / bonds 
(B) 0.000051 
 
-0.001350 
 
(0.03) 
 
(-0.44) 
Borrowing power overseas (C) 
 
-0.092600 -0.113000 
  
(-1.31) (-1.26) 
(A) x (B) -0.000493 
  
 
(-0.16) 
  (A) x (C) 
 
0.038800 
 
  
(0.31) 
 (B) x (C) 
  
-0.005930 
   
(-0.10) 
Log likelihood -226.70 -38.99 -36.00 
Pseudo R squared 0.31 0.46 0.47 
AIC 473.40 97.98 92.00 
Number of observations 576 246 207 
 
Notes:  See Table 5.1 
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Table 5.9: Debt Structure and External Debt Crises with Banking Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.007950*** -0.012600*** -0.009630 6.69e-14 
 
(-2.99) (-2.70) (-1.56) (0.53) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.001130 0.000954 0.001090 3.02e-14** 
 
(0.93) (0.66) (0.67) (2.02) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000578*** -0.000844 -0.000048 -6.74e-14*** 
 
(-3.02) (-1.26) (-0.05) (-2.71) 
Exchange rate regime 0.011500*** 0.016600*** 0.019400*** 5.10e-13** 
 
(4.06) (3.04) (2.88) (1.97) 
Political stability -0.005020*** 0.002370 -0.004840 -1.43e-13 
 
(-3.47) (0.74) (-1.40) (-1.33) 
Total central government 
debt per GDP (%) 0.002770*** 0.005620*** 0.007420*** 5.40e-14*** 
 
(3.93) (3.49) (3.54) (2.64) 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
 
0.055900 
  
  
(0.81) 
  
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
  
0.000054 
 
   
(0.05) 
 
Borrowing power overseas 
   
-1.67e-11*** 
    
(-3.69) 
Banking crisis in previous 
2 years (d) 0.066200* 0.120000* 0.123000 6.20e-12 
 
(1.91) (1.76) (1.53) (0.11) 
Log likelihood -540.00 -271.80 -225.00 -37.92 
Pseudo R squared 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.56 
AIC 1096.00 561.60 468.10 93.84 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
                       Notes:  See Table 5.3 
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Table 5.10: Debt Structure and External Debt Crises with Currency Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.006050** -0.010800** -0.007860 -1.61e-14 
 
(-2.36) (-2.37) (-1.36) (-0.60) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000956 0.000845 0.000971 4.48e-15* 
 
(0.96) (0.71) (0.72) (1.71) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000575*** -0.000873 -0.000173 -1.72e-14** 
 
(-2.86) (-1.37) (-0.21) (-2.34) 
Exchange rate regime 0.007280*** 0.012200** 0.013900** 9.12e-14 
 
(2.69) (2.19) (2.08) (1.16) 
Political stability -0.003980*** 0.002490 -0.004590 -3.61e-14 
 
(-2.79) (0.80) (-1.38) (-1.39) 
Total central government 
debt per GDP (%) 0.002650*** 0.005600*** 0.007500*** 1.04e-14*** 
 
(4.32) (3.83) (3.85) (3.42) 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
 
0.026800 
  
  
(0.43) 
  
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
  
-0.000153 
 
   
(-0.17) 
 
Borrowing power overseas 
   
-4.14e-12*** 
    
(-3.82) 
Currency crisis in previous 
2 years (d) 0.191000*** 0.200000*** 0.217000*** 1.25e-12 
 
(4.28) (3.09) (2.95) (0.07) 
Log likelihood -525.90 -267.70 -221.20 -38.58 
Pseudo R squared 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.56 
AIC 1067.80 553.40 460.40 95.17 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 489 
                              Notes:  See Table 5.3 
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Table 5.11: Debt Structure and External Debt Crisis with OECD dummy 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.00512*** -0.0147*** -0.0102** 
 
(-3.46) (-3.28) (-2.09) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.000251 0.000851 0.000864 
 
(0.74) (0.58) (0.60) 
Trade per GDP (%) -0.000363*** -0.000366 0.000799 
 
(-2.99) (-0.56) (0.93) 
Exchange rate regime 0.00550*** 0.0214*** 0.0243*** 
 
(3.09) (3.57) (3.11) 
Political stability 0.00180** 0.00361 -0.00197 
 
(2.08) (1.15) (-0.68) 
Total central government debt per 
GDP (%) 0.00116*** 0.00482*** 0.00602*** 
 
(3.45) (3.21) (3.14) 
OECD (d) (A) -0.220*** -0.247*** -0.256*** 
 
(-6.36) (-3.06) (-3.17) 
Short term / Long term total 
external debt (B) 
 
0.00791 
 
  
(0.13) 
 Total government bank loans / 
bonds (C) 
  
-0.000551 
   
(-0.60) 
(A) x (B) 
 
0.680* 
 
  
(1.77) 
 (A) x (C) 
  
-0.0440 
   
(-1.20) 
Log likelihood -454.0 -264.3 -212.2 
Pseudo R squared 0.368 0.294 0.354 
AIC 924.0 548.5 444.4 
Number of observations 1712 692 576 
    Notes:  See Table 5.3 
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Table 5.12: Financial Crises and External Debt Crisis with OECD dummy 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
 Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.00423*** -0.00287** 
 
 
(-3.01) (-2.34) 
 Lag of inflation (%) 0.000223 0.000155 
 
 
(0.76) (0.76) 
 Trade per GDP (%) -0.000316*** -0.000249** 
 
 
(-2.70) (-2.21) 
 Exchange rate regime 0.00481*** 0.00276** 
 
 
(2.84) (2.08) 
 Political stability 0.00163** 0.00134** 
 
 
(1.98) (2.02) 
 Total central government debt per 
GDP (%) 0.00103*** 0.000796** 
 
 
(3.15) (2.49) 
 OECD (d) (A) -0.234*** -0.226*** 
 
 
(-6.41) (-6.93) 
 Banking crisis in previous 2 years (d) 
(B) 0.0187 
  
 
(1.26) 
  Currency crisis in previous 2 years (d) 
(C) 
 
0.0369* 
 
  
(1.88) 
 (A) x (B) 0.177 
  
 
(1.05) 
  (A) x (C) 
 
0.493** 
 
  
(2.02) 
 
Log likelihood -451.0 -440.7 
 Pseudo R squared 0.373 0.387 
 AIC 921.9 901.5 
 Number of observations 1712 1712 
 
    Notes:  See Table 5.3 
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Table 6.1: Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (FCLT) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.0966** 0.104** 0.102** -0.0260 
 
(-2.03) (2.54) (2.38) (-0.38) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.154*** -0.0402*** -0.0392*** -0.142*** 
 
(-8.48) (-5.65) (-5.77) (-5.97) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0203*** 0.0289*** 0.0327*** 0.0207*** 
 
(8.57) (11.00) (8.62) (9.09) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.158*** 0.315*** 
 
(3.60) (2.65) (3.20) (4.01) 
Lag of political stability 0.399*** -0.0542** 0.00642 0.239*** 
 
(13.63) (-2.57) (0.28) (5.04) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0275*** -0.0388*** -0.0603*** -0.0185*** 
 
(-5.87) (-5.18) (-6.60) (-2.81) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
2.718*** 
  
  
(4.60) 
  Lag of total government bank loans 
/ bonds 
  
0.0291** 
 
   
(2.42) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0478*** 
    
(3.18) 
Constant 11.69*** 8.618*** 9.253*** 9.827*** 
 
(19.48) (12.38) (12.60) (10.40) 
Log likelihood -3026.2 -907.4 -772.7 -1290.9 
R squared 0.298 0.443 0.438 0.372 
AIC 6066.3 1830.8 1561.3 2597.8 
Number of observations 1041 399 336 464 
          
Notes: t statistics in parentheses,     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.2. Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (FCLT) with Banking Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.140*** 0.0431 0.0524 -0.0963 
 
(-2.93) (1.09) (1.25) (-1.45) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.153*** -0.0396*** -0.0394*** -0.140*** 
 
(-8.71) (-6.46) (-6.54) (-6.27) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0205*** 0.0287*** 0.0311*** 0.0202*** 
 
(8.77) (11.37) (8.39) (9.13) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.126*** 0.119** 0.148*** 0.276*** 
 
(3.39) (2.56) (3.03) (3.49) 
Lag of political stability 0.389*** -0.0661*** -0.00864 0.216*** 
 
(13.34) (-3.49) (-0.43) (4.87) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0284*** -0.0398*** -0.0607*** -0.0210*** 
 
(-6.13) (-5.27) (-6.56) (-3.18) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
2.906*** 
  
  
(5.29) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
0.0233* 
 
   
(1.95) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0445*** 
    
(2.99) 
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -1.495*** -1.948*** -1.533*** -1.762** 
 
(-2.85) (-4.05) (-2.96) (-2.55) 
Constant 12.15*** 9.287*** 9.991*** 11.01*** 
 
(19.78) (13.07) (13.09) (11.19) 
Log likelihood -3021.1 -894.2 -766.3 -1286.5 
R squared 0.305 0.479 0.459 0.384 
AIC 6058.1 1806.4 1550.5 2590.9 
Number of observations 1041 399 336 464 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.3: Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (FCLT) with Currency Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.180*** 0.0267 0.0334 -0.0975* 
 
(-4.20) (0.72) (0.84) (-1.66) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.125*** -0.0297*** -0.0302*** -0.119*** 
 
(-8.61) (-5.05) (-5.10) (-6.35) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0208*** 0.0309*** 0.0321*** 0.0208*** 
 
(9.60) (13.97) (9.16) (10.37) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.195*** 0.333*** 
 
(4.75) (3.91) (4.34) (4.66) 
Lag of political stability 0.369*** -0.0647*** -0.00865 0.202*** 
 
(13.34) (-3.60) (-0.45) (4.91) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0268*** -0.0378*** -0.0588*** -0.0182*** 
 
(-6.31) (-6.09) (-7.32) (-3.26) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
3.002*** 
  
  
(5.53) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
0.0250** 
 
   
(2.02) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0444*** 
    
(3.16) 
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -5.528*** -3.174*** -2.956*** -4.977*** 
 
(-8.33) (-7.47) (-6.43) (-5.84) 
Constant 12.00*** 8.687*** 9.577*** 10.32*** 
 
(20.90) (13.86) (14.20) (11.90) 
Log likelihood -2985.0 -873.7 -749.0 -1269.1 
R squared 0.351 0.530 0.512 0.428 
AIC 5986.1 1765.4 1515.9 2556.2 
Number of observations 1041 399 336 464 
      Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.4: Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (LCLT) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.107* 0.119** 0.0986** -0.0283 
 
(-1.93) (2.46) (2.07) (-0.40) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.240*** -0.0809*** -0.0697*** -0.226*** 
 
(-9.25) (-4.22) (-3.73) (-9.30) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0183*** 0.0296*** 0.0285*** 0.0186*** 
 
(8.53) (8.53) (6.02) (8.28) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.180*** 0.362*** 0.384*** 0.327*** 
 
(4.62) (6.56) (7.10) (4.34) 
Lag of political stability 0.266*** -0.158*** -0.0333 0.246*** 
 
(8.15) (-4.57) (-0.83) (4.63) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0191*** -0.0684*** -0.0873*** -0.0247*** 
 
(-3.55) (-7.40) (-9.07) (-3.87) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
0.268 
  
  
(0.35) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
0.0206** 
 
   
(2.16) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0269*** 
    
(3.20) 
Constant 12.86*** 11.43*** 11.03*** 11.88*** 
 
(18.30) (11.60) (10.79) (10.41) 
Log likelihood -2249.7 -753.9 -614.4 -1119.5 
R squared 0.292 0.477 0.518 0.433 
AIC 4513.5 1523.9 1244.9 2255.1 
Number of observations 783 312 255 430 
                                                                    Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.5: Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (LCLT) with Banking Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.132** 0.0337 0.00221 -0.0665 
 
(-2.39) (0.73) (0.05) (-0.98) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.236*** -0.0687*** -0.0574*** -0.218*** 
 
(-8.90) (-3.94) (-3.44) (-8.71) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0186*** 0.0301*** 0.0270*** 0.0185*** 
 
(8.54) (9.01) (5.98) (8.39) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.176*** 0.340*** 0.360*** 0.306*** 
 
(4.42) (6.26) (6.66) (4.19) 
Lag of political stability 0.265*** -0.168*** -0.0522 0.238*** 
 
(8.13) (-5.17) (-1.47) (4.60) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0198*** -0.0718*** -0.0917*** -0.0260*** 
 
(-3.62) (-8.21) (-9.94) (-4.04) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
0.742 
  
  
(1.15) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
0.0149 
 
   
(1.64) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0255*** 
    
(3.04) 
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -0.712 -2.278*** -2.509*** -0.935 
 
(-1.24) (-3.40) (-3.54) (-1.55) 
Constant 13.07*** 12.23*** 12.29*** 12.43*** 
 
(18.23) (13.04) (12.73) (11.25) 
Log likelihood -2248.8 -744.9 -605.4 -1118.0 
R squared 0.294 0.506 0.551 0.437 
AIC 4513.6 1507.8 1228.7 2254.0 
Number of observations 783 312 255 430 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.6:  Debt Structure and the Level of Credit Ratings (LCLT) with Currency Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) -0.196*** 0.00516 -0.0148 -0.0868 
 
(-3.82) (0.12) (-0.34) (-1.34) 
Lag of inflation (%) -0.202*** -0.0588*** -0.0484*** -0.193*** 
 
(-7.95) (-3.42) (-2.87) (-7.71) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.0190*** 0.0326*** 0.0284*** 0.0189*** 
 
(9.09) (10.06) (6.36) (8.85) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.196*** 0.375*** 0.398*** 0.327*** 
 
(5.31) (7.26) (7.80) (4.61) 
Lag of political stability 0.246*** -0.167*** -0.0557* 0.223*** 
 
(7.96) (-5.50) (-1.72) (4.59) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) -0.0186*** -0.0652*** -0.0829*** -0.0244*** 
 
(-3.79) (-8.14) (-9.38) (-4.39) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
0.764 
  
  
(1.26) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
0.0137 
 
   
(1.35) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.0251*** 
    
(3.13) 
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -4.487*** -3.546*** -3.676*** -3.306*** 
 
(-4.94) (-5.39) (-5.14) (-3.55) 
Constant 13.16*** 11.55*** 11.56*** 12.24*** 
 
(19.60) (13.03) (12.72) (11.56) 
Log likelihood -2228.8 -734.3 -597.4 -1108.6 
R squared 0.329 0.539 0.579 0.461 
AIC 4473.5 1486.6 1212.7 2235.2 
Number of observations 783 312 255 430 
 
Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.7: Debt Structure and the Change of Credit Ratings (FCLT) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0458*** 0.0639*** 0.0729*** 0.0379** 
 
(3.93) (2.81) (2.93) (2.18) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.00401 0.00338 0.00326 0.00195 
 
(1.01) (0.71) (0.66) (0.33) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000462 0.00127 0.00266 0.000257 
 
(1.02) (0.80) (1.34) (0.42) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0160** 0.0447* 0.0496* 0.0206 
 
(2.02) (1.83) (1.88) (0.86) 
Lag of political stability 0.0129 0.00922 0.00492 0.0172 
 
(1.62) (0.77) (0.31) (1.08) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.00178 0.00332 0.00726** 0.00247 
 
(1.56) (1.23) (2.12) (1.45) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.691* 
  
  
(-1.65) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00185 
 
   
(-0.29) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.000629 
    
(0.57) 
Constant -0.536*** -0.792** -1.282*** -0.567 
 
(-3.02) (-2.04) (-2.78) (-1.64) 
Log likelihood -1340.9 -613.7 -536.1 -659.5 
R squared 0.0340 0.0718 0.0723 0.0227 
AIC 2695.7 1243.3 1088.2 1334.9 
Number of observations 999 374 315 461 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.8:  Debt Structure and the Change of Credit Ratings (FCLT) with Banking 
Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0279** 0.0354 0.0405 0.00800 
 
(2.18) (1.38) (1.44) (0.38) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.00514 0.00453 0.00402 0.00357 
 
(1.25) (0.89) (0.77) (0.57) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000513 0.00116 0.00161 0.0000743 
 
(1.16) (0.76) (0.80) (0.13) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0130 0.0397 0.0425 0.00430 
 
(1.65) (1.63) (1.61) (0.19) 
Lag of political stability 0.00835 0.00232 -0.00665 0.00765 
 
(1.19) (0.21) (-0.46) (0.54) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.00137 0.00254 0.00671* 0.00145 
 
(1.23) (0.90) (1.92) (0.85) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.608 
  
  
(-1.62) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00526 
 
   
(-0.78) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
-0.000686 
    
(-0.62) 
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -0.612*** -0.933** -1.016** -0.732** 
 
(-3.02) (-2.31) (-2.15) (-2.37) 
Constant -0.340** -0.453 -0.777* -0.0744 
 
(-2.03) (-1.11) (-1.67) (-0.24) 
Log likelihood -1321.7 -603.4 -527.1 -647.9 
R squared 0.0703 0.121 0.124 0.0705 
AIC 2659.4 1224.8 1072.3 1313.8 
Number of observations 999 374 315 461 
     
 
Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.9: Debt Structure and  the Change of Credit Ratings (FCLT) with Currency 
Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0383*** 0.0523** 0.0617** 0.0323* 
 
(3.36) (2.23) (2.49) (1.86) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.00711* 0.00549 0.00526 0.00413 
 
(1.67) (1.08) (0.99) (0.64) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000512 0.00160 0.00262 0.000278 
 
(1.13) (1.03) (1.30) (0.46) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0185** 0.0500** 0.0548** 0.0220 
 
(2.39) (2.11) (2.12) (0.93) 
Lag of political stability 0.0100 0.00720 0.00178 0.0144 
 
(1.41) (0.66) (0.12) (1.05) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.00185 0.00355 0.00758** 0.00250 
 
(1.60) (1.30) (2.18) (1.44) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.643 
  
  
(-1.59) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00232 
 
   
(-0.37) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.000403 
    
(0.35) 
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -0.474 -0.451 -0.454 -0.361 
 
(-1.61) (-1.35) (-1.21) (-0.92) 
Constant -0.508*** -0.786** -1.232*** -0.533 
 
(-2.90) (-2.00) (-2.65) (-1.56) 
Log likelihood -1334.6 -611.6 -534.5 -657.9 
R squared 0.0461 0.0820 0.0815 0.0294 
AIC 2685.1 1241.2 1087.0 1333.8 
Number of observations 999 374 315 461 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.10: Debt Structure and the Change of Credit Ratings (LCLT) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0415*** 0.0748*** 0.0891*** 0.0419** 
 
(3.09) (2.89) (3.02) (2.42) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.0131** 0.0169** 0.0146** 0.0145** 
 
(2.22) (2.45) (2.00) (2.16) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000499 0.00129 0.00192 0.000879 
 
(0.86) (0.68) (0.78) (0.89) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0233*** 0.0711*** 0.0711*** 0.0528** 
 
(2.94) (2.63) (2.64) (2.04) 
Lag of political stability 0.0201 0.0211 0.0257 0.0333 
 
(1.60) (1.11) (0.87) (1.15) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.000897 0.00294 0.00635 0.00219 
 
(0.65) (0.76) (1.59) (1.33) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.888 
  
  
(-1.30) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00694 
 
   
(-1.17) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.00205* 
    
(1.79) 
Constant -0.689*** -1.236** -1.697*** -1.206** 
 
(-3.01) (-2.40) (-2.81) (-2.35) 
Log likelihood -1046.3 -439.5 -372.7 -530.9 
R squared 0.0408 0.126 0.131 0.0747 
AIC 2106.5 894.9 761.5 1077.8 
Number of observations 733 286 233 416 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.11: Debt Structure and the Change of Credit Ratings (LCLT) with Banking 
Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0163 0.0248 0.0301 0.0124 
 
(1.26) (1.03) (1.19) (0.73) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.0183*** 0.0276*** 0.0257*** 0.0212*** 
 
(2.89) (3.54) (2.92) (2.95) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000725 0.00156 0.000967 0.000832 
 
(1.25) (0.87) (0.42) (0.92) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0176** 0.0513** 0.0485** 0.0350 
 
(2.34) (2.23) (2.15) (1.52) 
Lag of political stability 0.0186 0.0146 0.0124 0.0274 
 
(1.63) (0.89) (0.53) (1.06) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.000298 0.000627 0.00344 0.00127 
 
(0.22) (0.16) (0.78) (0.77) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.616 
  
  
(-1.06) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00963* 
 
   
(-1.72) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.000943 
    
(0.88) 
Banking crisis in previous 2 years -0.732*** -1.373*** -1.549*** -0.747*** 
 
(-3.29) (-2.97) (-2.74) (-2.89) 
Constant -0.480** -0.710 -0.865** -0.771* 
 
(-2.48) (-1.64) (-2.07) (-1.91) 
Log likelihood -1029.4 -422.2 -357.5 -517.4 
R squared 0.0839 0.225 0.237 0.133 
AIC 2074.7 862.4 733.0 1052.7 
Number of observations 733 286 233 416 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 6.12: Debt Structure and the Change of Credit Ratings (LCLT) with Currency 
Crisis 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of GDP growth (%) 0.0299** 0.0566** 0.0717** 0.0335* 
 
(2.26) (2.09) (2.53) (1.87) 
Lag of inflation (%) 0.0197*** 0.0225*** 0.0199** 0.0205** 
 
(2.91) (2.88) (2.19) (2.37) 
Lag of trade per GDP (%) 0.000609 0.00185 0.00193 0.000957 
 
(1.03) (0.98) (0.77) (0.97) 
Lag of exchange rate regime 0.0251*** 0.0717*** 0.0718** 0.0519** 
 
(3.10) (2.62) (2.59) (1.98) 
Lag of political stability 0.0176 0.0197 0.0221 0.0309 
 
(1.52) (1.12) (0.83) (1.16) 
Lag of total central government debt 
per GDP (%) 0.000967 0.00351 0.00705* 0.00226 
 
(0.68) (0.89) (1.68) (1.34) 
Lag of short term / long term total 
external debt 
 
-0.788 
  
  
(-1.28) 
  Lag of total government bank loans / 
bonds 
  
-0.00774 
 
   
(-1.30) 
 
Lag of borrowing power overseas 
   
0.00180 
    
(1.53) 
Currency crisis in previous 2 years -0.637* -0.623 -0.619 -0.498 
 
(-1.72) (-1.30) (-1.00) (-1.15) 
Constant -0.655*** -1.228** -1.617*** -1.160** 
 
(-2.96) (-2.35) (-2.79) (-2.35) 
Log likelihood -1039.5 -436.4 -370.7 -527.7 
R squared 0.0583 0.144 0.146 0.0891 
AIC 2095.0 890.9 759.4 1073.3 
Number of observations 733 286 233 416 
     Notes: See Table 6.1 
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Table 7: Overview of the Signs and Significances of the Debt Structure 
Debt Crises 
       
Domestic Debt Crisis  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
_ 10% _ 5% _ 5% 
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
_ 5% _ 10% _ 10% 
Borrowing power 
overseas 
_ 1% 
    
 
  
 
    
External Debt Crisis  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt       
Total government bank 
loans / bonds       
Borrowing power 
overseas 
_ 1% _ 1% _ 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
      
Level of the Credit Ratings 
      
FCLT  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
+ 1% + 1% + 1% 
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
+ 5% + 10% + 5% 
Borrowing power 
overseas 
+ 1% + 1% + 1% 
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LCLT  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt       
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
+ 5% 
    
Borrowing power 
overseas 
+ 1% + 1% + 1% 
 
 
 
   
  
 
Change of the Credit Ratings 
      
FCLT  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
_ 10% 
    
Total government bank 
loans / bonds       
Borrowing power 
overseas       
 
 
      
LCLT  
with Banking Crisis with Currency Crisis 
 
sign significance sign significance sign significance 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt       
Total government bank 
loans / bonds   
_ 10% 
  
Borrowing power 
overseas 
+ 10% 
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Appendix 
A1: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
 
Domestic Debt Crisis 
 
Domestic debt crisis is the case when principal or interest of 
domestic debts are not repaid on due date, or are restructured in the 
terms which are worse for creditors than original terms. It also 
includes forcible conversion of foreign currency deposit into local 
currency and deposit freezes. Domestic debt refers to public debts 
issued under domestic law. 
Source: Reinhart & Rogoff (2011a), Reinhart & Rogoff (2011b), and 
Reinhart’s database (http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/) 
 
 
 
External Debt Crisis Outright default on payment of external debt obligations including 
non-payment, repudiation, or the restructuring of debt into terms less 
favourable to the lender than in the original contract. External debt 
refers to public debts issued under foreign legal jurisdiction. 
Source: Reinhart & Rogoff (2011a), Reinhart & Rogoff (2011b), and 
Reinhart’s database (http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/) 
 
 
 
Lag of GDP growth (%) Previous year of the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  
Source: WDI 
 
 
 
Lag of inflation (%) Previous year of the inflation as measured by the annual percentage 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, which shows the rate of 
price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is 
the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency. 
Source: WDI 
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Trade per GDP (%) The sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
percentage share of GDP. All in current US dollars. 
Source: WDI 
 
 
 
Exchange rate regime Exchange rate regime is classified from 1 to 15. The higher the 
numbers, more floating exchange rate regime is applied in a country. 
Details of each classification are provided in Appendix A5. 
Source: Reinhart’s database 
(http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/) 
 
 
 
 
Political stability Use POLITY2 index of Polity IV Project. POLITY2 is a modified 
version of POLITY score which is calculated by subtracting 
autocracy score from a democracy score. However, simple sum 
contains observations such as -66 and -88 in case of foreign 
interruption and transition period. POLITY2 score converts these 
numbers to conventional polity scores (from -10 to 10). 
Source: Polity IV Project 
 
 
 
 
Total central government 
debt per GDP (%) 
Use “Total (domestic plus external) gross central government 
debt/GDP” in Reinhart’s database. Then, this data is supplemented 
by “Total central government debt % of GDP” in the OECD library 
and “Central government debt, total (% of GDP)” in the WDI. 
Source: Reinhart’s database 
(http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/), the OECD library, and the 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short term / Long term 
total external debt 
This is calculated as short term total external debt divided by 
medium/long term total external debt. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
Total government bank 
loans / bonds 
This is calculated as commercial banks of general government debt 
divided by other private creditors of general government debt. 
Underlying assumption is that most of the other private creditors are 
bonds. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF) 
 
 
  
96 
 
 
Borrowing power overseas This is calculated as securities issued in local currency of a country 
divided by total international debt of that country. For example, if a 
country issues all debts in foreign currency, this ratio becomes zero 
Source: The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) 
Note: Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2002) subtracts this ratio from 
one 
 
 
 
 
Banking crisis in previous 
2 years 
Defined as a banking crisis if it meets two conditions: 
1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system 
(as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and/or bank liquidations). 
2. Significant banking policy intervention measures in response 
to significant losses in the banking system. 
For more details, see Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
This variable takes the value of 1 in the year if the country 
experiences this banking crisis in that year or previous two years, 
otherwise takes the value of 0. 
Source: Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 Currency crisis in previous 
2 years 
Defined as a currency crisis if a nominal depreciation of the country’s 
currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar is at least 30 per cent, and also that 
is at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in 
the year before. 
This variable takes the value of 1 in the year if the country 
experiences this currency crisis in that year or previous two years, 
otherwise takes the value of 0. 
Source: Laeven & Valencia (2012) 
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A2: List of Countries and Number of Observations 
Country 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Country 
Number of 
Observations 
Algeria 34 
 
Korea, Rep. 34 
Angola 34 
 
Malaysia 34 
Argentina 34 
 
Mauritius 34 
Australia 34 
 
Mexico 34 
Austria 34 
 
Morocco 34 
Belgium 34 
 
Myanmar 34 
Bolivia 34 
 
Netherlands 34 
Brazil 34 
 
New Zealand 34 
Canada 34 
 
Nicaragua 34 
Central African 
Republic 34 
 
Nigeria 34 
Chile 34 
 
Norway 34 
China 34 
 
Panama 34 
Colombia 34 
 
Paraguay 34 
Costa Rica 34 
 
Peru 34 
Cote d'Ivoire 34 
 
Philippines 34 
Denmark 34 
 
Poland 34 
Dominican Republic 34 
 
Portugal 34 
Ecuador 34 
 
Romania 34 
Egypt 34 
 
Russian 
Federation 34 
El Salvador 34 
 
Singapore 34 
Finland 34 
 
South Africa 34 
France 34 
 
Spain 34 
Germany 34 
 
Sri Lanka 34 
Ghana 34 
 
Sweden 34 
Greece 34 
 
Switzerland 34 
Guatemala 34 
 
Thailand 34 
Honduras 34 
 
Tunisia 34 
Hungary 34 
 
Turkey 34 
Iceland 34 
 
United Kingdom 34 
India 34 
 
United States 34 
Indonesia 34 
 
Uruguay 34 
Ireland 34 
 
Venezuela 34 
Italy 34 
 
Zambia 34 
Japan 34 
 
Zimbabwe 34 
Kenya 34 
 
Total 2,346 
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A3. Classifications of the Standard & Poor’s credit ratings 
 
Numerical value Credit ratings 
AAA 20 
AA+ 19 
               AA 18 
AA- 17 
A+ 16 
                A 15 
A- 14 
BBB+ 13 
              BBB 12 
BBB- 11 
BB+ 10 
               BB 9 
BB- 8 
B+ 7 
                B 6 
B- 5 
CCC+ 4 
             CCC 3 
CCC- 2 
CC 1 
SD 0 
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A4: Number of Observations for Borrowing Power Overseas by Country 
 
Country Number of Observations 
Argentina 18 
Australia 18 
Brazil 18 
Canada 18 
Chile 
 18 
China 18 
Colombia 18 
Denmark 18 
Egypt 10 
Hungary 18 
Iceland 18 
India 18 
Indonesia 18 
Japan 18 
Korea, Rep. 18 
Malaysia 18 
Mexico 18 
New Zealand 18 
Norway 18 
Philippines 18 
Poland 17 
Russian Federation 18 
Singapore 18 
South Africa 18 
Sweden 18 
Switzerland 18 
Thailand 18 
Turkey 18 
United Kingdom 18 
United States 18 
Total 531 
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                  A5: Classifications of the Exchange Rate Regime 
 
The classification codes of the exchange rate regime are: 
      
1 • No separate legal tender 
      
2 • Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
    
3 • Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
  
4 • De facto peg 
       
5 • Pre announced crawling peg 
      
6 • Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
  
7 • De factor crawling peg 
      
8 • De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
   
9 • Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 
   
10 • De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
   
11 • Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both 
  
appreciation and depreciation over time) 
      
12 • Managed floating 
       
13 • Freely floating 
       
14 • Freely falling 
       
15 • Dual market in which parallel market data is missing. 
    
 
                  Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
